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Sustainability	 should	 be	 part	 of	 the	 development	 process.	 Economic	 growth	 is	 often	
associated	 with	 more	 pollution	 and	 the	 degradation	 of	 ecosystems,	 which	 in	 turn	
negatively	 impact	 human	health	 and	 economic	 activities	 relying	 on	 natural	 resources.	
Yet,	despite	this	negative	feedback	of	poor	environmental	quality	to	the	economy,	policy	
makers	are	generally	reluctant	to	impose	more	stringent	environmental	regulations	on	
firms.	They	fear	that	it	might	erode	firms’	global	competitiveness,	thereby	slowing	down	
the	development	process.		
	
The	 conventional	wisdom	 concerning	 environmental	 protection	 is	 that	 it	 comes	 at	 an	
additional	 cost	 to	 firms.	 Reducing	 pollution	 from	 production	 processes	 requires	 that	
firms	 replace	 dirty	 inputs	 by	 cleaner	 but	 costlier	 ones,	 and	 therefore	 switch	 to	more	
expensive	 technologies,	 invest	 in	devices	 that	 clean‐up	polluting	emissions,	 treat	 their	
waste,	 recycle	 water,	 and	 improve	 energy	 efficiency.	 	 All	 these	 strategies	 add	 new	
expenses	 to	 their	 balance	 sheets.	 Such	 expenses	 can	 nevertheless	 turn	 out	 to	 be	
profitable	in	the	long	run.	
	
The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	review	economic	arguments	and	to	show	that	the	additional	
cost	 of	 environmental	 protection	 can	 sometimes	 lead	 to	 a	 competitive	 advantage	 for	
firms.	 This	 implies	 that	 green	 policy	 can	 boost	 a	 firm’s	 competitiveness	 while	 at	 the	
same	time	improving	environmental	quality.	We	distinguish	between	four	channels	for	
which	green	policy	might	 enhance	 competitiveness.	 First,	 green	 labels	 enable	 firms	 to	
differentiate	their	products	from	those	of	their	competitors.	In	Section	1	we	explain	why	
this	product	differentiation	strategy	can	be	profitable	and	what	the	role	of	public	policy	
can	 be.	 Second,	 firms	 can	make	money	 by	 selling	 and	 adopting	 green	 technology.	 As	
explained	 in	 Section	 2,	 this	 argument	 applies	 particularly	 to	 climate‐friendly	
technologies	 that	 are	 bought	 by	 developed	 countries	 due	 to	 energy	 mandates,	 or	
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financed	 by	 carbon	 offsetting	 projects	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Third,	 investment	 in	
greener	technology	might	lead	to	productivity	improvements	that	more	than	offset	the	
additional	 costs	 of	 environmental	 protection.	This	 argument	 relies	 on	 the	well‐known	
Porter	 Hypothesis	 that	 we	 review	 in	 Section	 3.	 In	 Section	 4	 we	 examine	 how	 green	
policy	 can	 increase	 competitiveness	 due	 to	 knowledge	 spillovers	 in	 the	 innovation	
process.	We	conclude	with	policy	recommendations	for	designing	green	growth	policies	
that	are	likely	to	leverage	competitive	advantages	in	international	markets.			
	
	
1‐Higher	 market	 shares	 by	 differentiating	 products	 based	 on	 environmental	
quality	
	
1.1	Supplying	greener	products	as	a	vertical	differentiation	strategy	
Firms	 can	 reduce	 their	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 environment	 by	 improving	 the	
environmental	 quality	 of	 their	 products	 throughout	 their	 lifecycle.	 They	 can	 use	 less	
polluting	inputs	(e.g.,	fewer	pesticides	or	other	harmful	chemicals),	increase	their	share	
of	 renewable	 sources	 of	 energy	 (e.g.,	 wind	 and	 solar	 power),	 or	 adopt	 sustainable	
production	procedures	(e.g.	replant	forests	after	harvesting	or	use	fishing	practices	less	
damaging	to	ecosystems).	 	They	can	also	make	their	product	easier	to	recycle,	and	can	
save	on	packaging.1		Firms	are	sometimes	forced	to	do	so	when	governments	set	more	
stringent	 standards,	 but	 in	 many	 cases	 firms	 go	 beyond	 minimal	 standards	 on	
environmental	quality.		
	
Supplying	 greener	 products	 generally	 entails	 additional	 costs.	 By	 going	 beyond	
mandatory	 standards	 and	 thus	 increasing	 their	 costs,	 companies	 put	 themselves	 at	 a	
disadvantage	 compared	 to	 competitors.	 Yet	 they	 might	 be	 able	 to	 recover	 this	 extra	
production	 cost	 through	 revenue	 if	 consumers	 agree	 to	 pay	 more	 for	 environmental	
quality.	 	Supplying	greener	quality	products	can	be	viewed	as	a	vertical	differentiation	
strategy.	Firms	can	enjoy	a	competitive	advantage	by	differentiating	their	products	from	
those	of	competitors,	with	regard	to	environmental	quality.	By	doing	so	they	move	away	
																																																								
1	Haned	et	al	(2015)	have	investigated	the		“ecodesign”	practises	based	on	life‐cycle	
analysis	implemented	using	a	questionnaire.		In	their	sample,		45%	of	the	firms	found	
those	practices	profitable.			
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from	 the	 head‐on	 competition	 among	 perfectly	 substitutable	 products	 that	 erodes	
profits.	They	take	advantage	of	market	power	in	a	niche	of	consumers	who	are	willing	to	
pay	more	for	greener	products.	Ultimately,	the	price	premium	on	greener	products	can	
offset	 their	 higher	 production	 costs.	 Such	 a	 successful	 vertical	 differentiation	 strategy	
requires	that	consumers	be	able	to	identify	products	with	higher	environmental	quality,	
through	eco‐labels.		
		
1.2	Labelling	and	certification	
Firms	can	signal	the	higher	environmental	quality	of	their	products	through	certification	
and	 labelling.	 Examples	 include	 the	 Forest	 Stewardship	 Council	 (FSC)	 certificate	 for	
wood	produced	from	sustainably	managed	forests,	and	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council	
(MSC)	 certificate	 for	 seafood	 harvested	 using	 sustainable	 fishing	 procedures.	 Organic	
food	labels	issued	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	Agriculture	or	by	the	European	Commission	
are	 presently	 one	 of	 the	 most	 popular	 ways	 to	 differentiate	 products	 in	 the	 food	
industry.	 This	 does	matter,	 since	 the	 similitude	 of	 many	 agricultural	 products	means	
that	 differentiation	 is	 often	 the	 only	 way	 to	 secure	 a	 competitive	 advantage.	 Organic	
food	 labels	 are	well	 known	by	 consumers	 and	 often	 supported	 by	 public	 authorities.2	
This	system	induces	higher	costs	and	lower	yields	for	producers	at	least	in	the	short	run	
as	it	restricts	the	use	of	many	inputs	(pesticides,	antibiotics,	fertilizers).3	
	
Fair	 trade	 labels	 also	 have	 a	 green	 component	 insofar	 as	 they	 favour	 less	 intensive	
agricultural	 practices.	 Environmental	 criteria	 in	 fair	 trade	 production	 include	 the	
banning	of	certain	harmful	chemicals,	reduction	of	the	use	of	pesticides,	and	promotion	
of	 natural	 biological	methods	 to	 preserve	 soil	 and	 biodiversity	 such	 as	 crop	 rotation.		
Evidence	shows	that	producer‐label	fair	trade	and	organic	products	enjoy	higher	prices.	
For	instance,	in	a	survey	of	coffee	producers	in	Central	America	and	Mexico,	Méndez	et	
																																																								
2	In	a	recent	paper	on	subsidies	provided	by	the	European	Union	in	France	to	encourage	
greener	agricultural	practices,	Chabé‐Ferret	and	Subervie	(2013)	found	that	conversion	
to	organic	farming	was	the	most	cost‐effective	practice	among	all	agro‐environmental	
schemes	implemented	in	France		since	many	farmers	would	not	switch	to	organic	
without	the	subsidy.		
	
3	For	instance,	Ramesh	et	al.	(2010)	found	that	organic	farming	reduced	yields	by	9.2%	
on	average	in	the	sample	of	certified	farms	they	surveyed.		This	figure	dropped	to	20%	
for	rice	and	wheat	and	was	up	to	25%	lower	than	conventional	farming	for	cotton.		
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al.	(2010)	found	a	significant	positive	correlation	between	average	sales	prices	for	coffee	
for	both	fair	trade	and	organic	labels.	In	Nicaragua,	Bacon	evaluated	an	average	price	of	
$0.84	 per	 pound	 for	 fair	 trade	 coffee,4	$0.63	 for	 organic	 coffee	 and	 $0.41	 for	
conventional	coffee	in	2000‐2001	(see	Dragusanu	et	al.	2014	for	a	survey).	
	
The	 final	 consumers	 are	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 to	 value	 the	 environmental	 attributes	 of	
products.	Private	companies	often	take	steps	to	green	their	supply	chain.	For	 instance,	
production	 plants	 involved	 in	 the	 ISO	 14001	 certification	 procedure	 commit	 to	 using	
environmental	 performance	 criteria	 for	 selecting	 their	 suppliers.5	Governments	 also	
favour	 products	 and	 suppliers	with	 better	 environmental	 performance	 through	 green	
public	 purchasing	 policies.	 In	 the	 U.S.,	 the	 Federal	 Acquisition	 Regulations	 provide	
detailed	rules	governing	procurement	by	all	 federal	agencies.	For	 instance,	 these	rules	
specify	 that	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	Agency	 (EPA)	 has	 to	 prepare	 guidelines	 on	
the	 availability,	 sources,	 and	 potential	 uses	 of	 recovered	 materials	 and	 associated	
products,	 including	 solid	 waste	 management	 services.	 They	 require	 federal	 agencies	
themselves	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	 affirmative	 procurement	 programs	 for	 EPA	
designated	products	(Kunzik,	2003:	203).		
	
1.3	Labelling	and	certification:	a	role	for	green	policy	
For	 the	 vertical	 differentiation	 strategy	 to	 be	 successful,	 the	 eco‐label	 should	 convey	
credible	and	transparent	information	to	consumers.	Credibility	requires	that	consumers	
trust	what	a	label	means	in	terms	of	environmental	protection.	The	criteria	for	labelling	
and	its	implementation	should	be	advertised	in	an	understandable	way	for	non‐experts.	
Procedures	 for	 certification	 should	 be	 immune	 to	 corruption	 and	 manipulation	 by	
companies	that	would	like	to	“greenwash”	their	own	products,	 i.e.,	obtain	a	green	logo	
without	paying	the	cost	in	terms	of	environmental	protection.	The	label	itself	should	be	
legible	 and	 easily	 identifiable	 by	 consumers.	 Public	 policy	 can	 help	 on	 that	matter	 in	
several	respects.	Public	administrations	can	facilitate	the	definition	and	dissemination	of	
labelling	criteria,	support	certification	by	agencies	and	NGOs,	ensure	the	traceability	of	
																																																								
4	Price	paid	to	farmers	at	farm	gate	net	of	costs	paid	to	the	cooperative	for	transport,	
processing,	certification,	debt	service,	and	export.	
	
5	In	a	sample	of	four	thousand	facilities	in	seven	OECD	countries,	Johnstone	et	al.	(2007)	
found	that	43%	assess	their	suppliers’	environmental	performance.	
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products	 along	 the	 supply	 chain,	 and	 simplify	 and	 harmonise	 the	 framing	 of	 labels	 to	
consumers.	At	a	country	level,	public	authorities	should	make	labelling	on	international	
markets	both	feasible	at	a	reasonable	cost,	and	credible.	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	
setting	up	 their	 own	 labels.	Relying	on	 the	most	 respected	 and	 internationally	known	
labels	 often	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 a	 more	 effective	 strategy.	 Public	 administrations	 should	
facilitate	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 more	 successful	 eco‐labels	 within	 their	 juridical	
boundaries.	 This	would	 open	 the	 door	 to	 international	markets	 in	 regions	where	 the	
labels	 are	 valued,	 especially	 in	 higher	 income	 countries.	 It	 would	 also	 attract	 foreign	
investment	in	firms	supplying	labelled	products.			
	
	
2‐	Selling	and	adopting	green	technologies			
	
2.1	Environmental	policy	triggers	the	demand	for	green	technologies	
Environmental	 constraints	 are	 not	 detrimental	 to	 all	 sectors.	 Solving	 environmental	
problems	 has	 become	 a	 business	 opportunity	 for	 the	 companies	 supplying	 pollution‐
control	 technologies.	 For	 instance,	 the	 implementation	 of	 more	 stringent	 air	 quality	
standards	 in	Europe	and	 the	US	 increased	 the	demand	 for	 scrubbers	 to	 filter	SO2	and	
NOx	emissions	from	coal	power	plants.	It	also	fostered	innovation	in	scrubber	and	coal	
combustion	as	more	patents	were	issued	following	the	application	of	the	regulation		
(Popp	 2006).	 The	 growth	 of	 the	 so‐called	 “eco‐industry”,	which	 supplies	 technologies	
that	 mitigate	 or	 clean‐up	 pollution,	 is	 driven	 by	 government	 interventions	 on	
environmental	protection.	
	
Government	strategies	are	not	 limited	to	more	stringent	standards	to	 fuel	 the	demand	
for	 pollution‐control	 technologies.	 Subsidies	 are	 a	 more	 popular	 means	 and	 are	
therefore	widely	used	to	support	cleaner	but	often	more	costly	technologies.	Firms	can	
make	money	by	harvesting	 those	 subsidies.	 	 Perhaps	 the	most	 famous	 example	 is	 the	
feed‐in	tariffs	for	renewable	sources	of	energy	implemented	in	more	than	50	countries	
including	 many	 developing	 countries.	 Public	 authorities	 have	 committed	 to	 buy	
electricity	 produced	 from	 wind	 and	 solar	 power	 at	 a	 fixed	 price	 well	 above	 the	
wholesale	market	price.	Some	countries	like	the	U.S.	have	opted	for	renewable	portfolio	
standard	 programmes,	 which	 generally	 require	 a	 minimum	 proportion	 of	 electricity	
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demand	to	be	met	by	renewable	sources.	Those	programmes	are	usually	 implemented	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 renewable	 energy	 certificates	 issued	 by	 state‐certified	 renewable	
generators.	 	 Those	 entities	 exceeding	 their	 renewable	 energy	 obligations	 can	 earn	
money	 by	 selling	 certificates	 to	 other	 entities	 that	 fail	 to	meet	 their	 obligations.	 Both	
types	of	support	to	renewables	have	been	very	successful.	They	have	boosted	the	wind	
and	 solar	 power	 industries	 not	 only	 where	 they	 were	 implemented	 but	 also	 abroad.	
Massive	investment	in	solar	power	in	countries	like	Germany	has	not	only	given	jobs	to	
new	companies	involved	in	installing	photovoltaic	(PV)	panels,	but	has	also	contributed	
to	 making	 China	 the	 largest	 solar	 PV	 cell	 producer	 in	 the	 world	 (see	 Pegels	 in	 this	
volume).	
	
2.2	Photovoltaic	in	China	
The	 exponential	 growth	 of	 photovoltaic	 installations	 from	 2003	 to	 2009	 was	
concentrated	in	a	few	developed	countries,	primarily	Germany,	Spain,	Japan	and	the	US.	
Yet,	 during	 this	 period,	 the	 production	 of	 photovoltaic	 cells	 moved	 to	 emerging	
economies,	 notably	 China.	 Starting	 with	 a	 1.6%	 market	 share	 for	 cell	 and	 module	
assembly	production	in	2003,	China	became	the	world	leader	with	a	35%	market	share	
in	2007,	just	five	years	later,	followed	by	the	European	Union,	with	29%	market	share.6	
China’s	 share	 manufactured	 PV	 panels	 has	 grown	 to	 50%	 in	 2015.7	This	 shift	 of	
leadership	from	Europe	to	China	has	triggered	much	criticism	in	Europe’s	policy	debate	
as	feed‐in	tariffs	were	supposed	to	give	first‐mover	advantages	to	European	companies	
in	the	wind	and	solar	power	industries.	They	did	indeed	benefit	activities	that	were	not	
exposed	 to	 international	 competition,	 such	 as	 PV	 installation.	 However,	 China	 took	
advantage	of	low‐cost	labour	and	relatively	cheap	energy	to	set	up	cell	production	and	
module	assembly	lines	without	much	prior	experience	in	manufacturing	cells.	According	
to	 De	 La	 Tour	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 China	 managed	 to	 obtain	 the	 technology	 through	 two	
channels.	First,	they	hired	highly	skilled	executives	trained	abroad	in	universities	or	in	
the	 PV	 industry.8	Second,	 they	 attracted	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 under	 a	 policy	 that	
forced	 foreign	 investors	 to	 accept	 joint	 ownership.	 Such	 joint	 ventures	 are	 likely	 to	
induce	more	knowledge	spillovers	between	the	foreign	investor	and	the	local	firm.	From	
																																																								
6	Source	:	De	La	Tour	et	al.	(2011)	
7	Source	:	http://solarcellcentral.com/index.html	
8	De	La	Tour	et	al.		(2011)	report	that	61%	of	the	board	members	of	the	three	largest	
Chinese	PV	firms	have	studied	or	worked	abroad.	
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a	country	receiving	technological	transfers,	China	became	one	of	the	main	innovators	in	
photovoltaic	solar.		
	
	
2.3	CDM	and	carbon	offset		
Companies	 in	 developing	 countries	 have	 benefited	 from	 another	 policy	 involving	
transfers	 from	developed	countries:	 the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	part	of	
the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 (KP).	 This	 policy	 allows	 greenhouse	 gas	 emitters	 subjected	 to	
emission	 reduction	 obligations	 (in	 countries	 included	 in	 Annex	 B	 of	 the	 KP)	 to	 offset	
their	own	emissions	by	investing	in	emission‐reducing	projects	in	other	countries	(non‐
Annex	B	countries).		The	aim	is	to	take	advantage	of	cheaper	mitigation	opportunities	in	
developing	 countries.	 The	 CDM	 can	 be	 used	 by	 companies	 (e.g.	 electricity	 producers,	
cement	and	glass	manufacturers,	etc.)	involved	in	the	European	Union	Emission	Trading	
Scheme	 (EU	 ETS)	 to	 obtain	 new	 allowances.	 It	 has	 been	 substantial:	 during	 phase	 2	
(2008‐2012)	 around	 1	 billion	 tonnes	 of	 CO2	 credits	where	 brought	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS	 by	
participants. 9 	More	 generally,	 many	 firms	 meet	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	
obligations	by	offsetting	their	own	carbon	emissions	through	carbon	credits	granted	by	
the	CDM.	
	
The	CDM	creates	carbon	credits	based	on	projects	certified	by	the	UNFCCC	provided	that	
an	 emission	 reduction	 is	 “additional”	 to	 any	 that	 would	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 most	
plausible	alternative	scenario	to	the	implementation	of	the	CDM	project	(e.g.	business‐
as‐usual	scenario).	Projects	must	also	be	accredited	by	the	host	government,	based	on	
sustainable	 development	 criteria.10	The	 additionality	 criterion	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	
creating	 perverse	 incentives	 for	 developing	 countries	 as	 it	 rewards	 the	 absence	 of	
climate	mitigation	policy	(e.g.	subsidies	to	renewables).	The	CDM	has	nevertheless	been	
very	 successful	 in	 bringing	 foreign	direct	 investment	 into	 developing	 countries.	 It	 has	
turned	into	a	lively	market	with	180	transactions	(i.e.	accredited	CDM	projects)	for	$2.5	
billion	in	total	in	2005	and	up	to	$6.5	billion	in	2008	(Lecoq	and	Ambrosi	2007,	Kossoy	
																																																								
9	Source	:	European	Union:	
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm	
10	See	Olsen	and	Fenhann	(2008)	for	a	description	of	the	criteria	and	process	for	
accreditation	by	national	authorities	in	China,	India,	Brazil,	Mexico,	South	Africa,	
Morocco	and	Armenia.		
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and	Ambrosi	2010).	One	drawback	of	the	CDM	is	that	projects	have	been	concentrated	
in	few	emerging	countries,	mainly	China,	India	and	Brazil,	for	few	specific	technologies.	
Despite	 the	 narrow	 scope	 of	 the	 CDM	 project,	 it	 has	 brought	 green	 technologies	 to	
developing	countries.					
	
2.4	Getting	competitive	advantage	by	issuing	carbon	credits	
The	 projects	 financed	 by	 the	 CDM	 are	 diverse.	 Carbon	 credits	 can	 be	 acquired	 by	
increasing	the	energy	efficiency	of	buildings	(insulation),	and	by	recovering	biogas	from	
agriculture	and	landfills.	Most	of	the	credits	gained	by	Chinese	companies	have	relied	on	
HFC‐23	destruction.	HFC‐23	is	a	by‐product	of	HCFC‐22,	a	widely	used	refrigerating	gas,	
which	 is	 also	 a	 powerful	 greenhouse	 gas.11	Worldwide,	 a	 large	 share	 of	 CDM	projects	
concerns	 electricity	 production	 through	 investments	 in	 renewable	 sources	 of	 energy	
such	as	hydro,	wind,	solar	or	biomass.		
	
The	 economic	 gains	 that	 host	 countries	 derive	 from	 CDM	 projects	 spread	 out	 of	 the	
company	that	implements	a	project	to	issue	the	carbon	credit.	These	gains	spread	to	the	
supply	of	green	technologies,	which	are	sometimes	located	in	developing	countries.	For	
instance,	most	wind	power	projects	 implemented	in	 India	use	equipment	produced	by	
local	 manufacturers,	 mainly	 Suzlon	 and	 Enercon	 India	 (Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 2009).	
Furthermore,	 many	 firms	 have	 used	 CDM	 projects	 as	 collateral	 to	 obtain	 upfront	
financing	 from	financial	partners.	For	 instance,	Lecocq	and	Ambrosi	 (2007)	report	 the	
case	of	pig‐iron	producers	 in	Brazil	who	obtained	 loans	 from	a	Dutch	bank	by	 issuing	
carbon	credits	 for	a	project	consisting	in	replacing	coal	by	charcoal.	Future	credits	are	
valuable	collateral	because	they	are	payable	in	strong	currencies	(dollars,	euro	or	yen)	
by	investors	with	high	credit	ratings.	
	
Local	 companies	 have	 benefited	 from	 another	 key	 component	 of	many	 CDM	projects:		
technology	transfers.	In	the	sample	of	3296	CDM	projects	examined	by	Schmid	(2012),	
36%	 of	 them	 claimed	 to	 have	 a	 technological	 transfer,	 accounting	 for	 59%	 of	 total	
																																																								
11	The	CDM	projects	on	HFC‐23	have	been	criticised	for	providing	windfall	gains	to	
firms,	as	these	projects	would	likely	have	occurred	eventually,	even	without	the	aid	of	
developed	countries.	Indeed,	as	the	cost	of	eliminating	HFC‐23	is	low,	firms	producing	
the	gas	made	more	money	from	selling	CDM	credits	than	from	selling	the	gas	itself	
(Wara	2007).	
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emission	 reduction.12	In	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 CDM	 projects,	 Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 (2008)	
distinguish	 between	 two	 types	 of	 technology	 transfer:	 knowledge	 transfer	 and	
equipment	transfer.	Knowledge	transfer	takes	place	when	the	local	project	benefits	from	
the	transfer	of	knowledge,	know‐how,	information	or	technical	assistance	from	a	foreign	
partner.	 Equipment	 transfer	 consists	 in	 importing	 devices	 such	 as	 wind	 turbines.	 In	
their	sample	of	644	CDM	projects,	these	authors	find	that	43%	of	them	had	technology	
transfers:	 9%	 only	 equipment,	 15%	 only	 knowledge,	 and	 most	 of	 them	 (19%)	 both	
equipment	 and	 knowledge.	 They	 investigated	 empirically	 the	 determinants	 of	
technology	transfers	among	CDM	projects.	Unsurprisingly,	the	size	of	the	project	and	the	
openness	to	trade	for	the	host	country	positively	influence	the	probability	of	technology	
transfers.	One	key	ingredient	that	matters	at	the	country	level	seems	to	be	its	absorptive	
or	technological	capability.13	Dechezleprêtre	et	al.	(2008)	found	that	absorptive	capacity	
has	a	positive	 influence	on	 technology	 transfers	 in	 the	energy	sector	and	the	chemical	
industry	but	a	strong	negative	impact	in	agriculture	(it	is	not	significant	in	most	industry	
sectors	 and	 waste	 management).	 According	 to	 the	 authors,	 it	 seems	 to	 reflect	 the	
antagonistic	effect	that	technological	capacity	has	on	international	technology	transfers.	
On	the	one	hand,	it	facilitates	transfer	when	firms	in	the	host	country	have	skills	to	use	
the	technology.	On	the	other	hand,	 it	 increases	the	 local	availability	of	 technology,	and	
therefore	 reduces	 the	 need	 for	 international	 transfers.	 	 The	 latter	 effect	 seems	
predominant	 in	 agriculture,	 while	 the	 opposite	 holds	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 the	
chemical	industry,	which	involves	more	advanced	techniques.	Overall,	empirical	studies	
have	found	an	ambiguous	role	of	absorptive	capacity	on	technological	transfer.	It	seems	
to	be	sector	specific	in	Dechezleprêtre	et	al.	(2008).	Other	studies	have	found	no	robust	
effect	of	absorptive	capacity	on	technological	transfer	(see	Schmid	2012,	Murphy	et	al.	
2015,	Gandenberger	et	al.	2015).			
	
																																																								
12	Haites	et	al.	(2006)	found	a	rate	of	technical	transfers	of	the	same	magnitude	in	a	
sample	of	860	CDM	projects:	one‐third	involved	technology	transfers	and	accounted	for	
two‐thirds	of	the	annual	emission	reductions.	
13	Technology	capacity	is	measured	by	an	index	developed	by	Archibugi	and	Coco	
(2004)	that	includes	the	measure	of	innovation	activity	(number	of	patents	and	number	
of	scientific	articles),	the	technological	infrastructures	(Internet	penetration,	telephone	
penetration	and	electricity	consumption)	and	the	development	of	human	skills 
(percentage	of	tertiary	science	and	engineering	enrolment,	mean	years	of	schooling,	
literacy	rate).	
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2.5	Green	growth	by	attracting	investment	in	carbon	offsetting		
Given	the	amount	of	money	drained	by	carbon	credits,	it	might	appear	as	a	surprise	that	
most	of	the	projects	ended	up	in	three	countries:	China,	India	and	Brazil,	which	together	
accounted	for	nearly	80%	of	the	credits	in	2006.14	Most	countries	from	Africa	were	left	
out.	 This	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 administrative	 costs	 of	 accreditation.	 To	 respect	
sovereignty,	 countries	 hosting	 projects	 have	 been	 associated	 in	 the	 accreditation	
process	 by	 the	 KP.	 The	 so‐called	 designated	 national	 authorities	 had	 to	 support	 the	
project	by	signing	a	 letter	of	approval	to	 issue	carbon	credits	(see	Olsen	and	Fenhann,	
2008,	 on	 how	 this	 is	 done	 in	 practice).	 	 As	 a	 result,	 no	 international	 standard	 for	
accreditation	 exists:	 countries	 have	 established	 their	 own	 distinct	 procedures	 and	
criteria.	This	easily	explains	why	companies	find	it	easier	to	specialise	in	few	countries	
and	few	technologies.		
	
Governments	can	take	action	to	attract	CDM	projects	–	and	more	generally	investment	
for	carbon	offsetting	–	by	making	accreditation	easier.	Procedures	could	be	standardized	
to	help	alleviate	the	administrative	cost	of	setting	up	a	CDM	project.15	Governments	can	
also	 design	 accreditation	 procedures	 to	maximise	 the	 economic	 benefits	 from	 carbon	
offsetting	 investment.	For	 instance,	 they	can	 include	 technological	 transfers	as	criteria	
for	 accreditation.	 As	 Popp	 (2011)	 argued,	 this	 has	 been	 done	 in	 South	 Korea,	 which	
requires	that	‘‘environmentally	sound	technologies	and	know‐how	shall	be	transferred’’	
by	CDM	projects	in	Korea.	As	a	result,	88	percent	of	the	emissions	reductions	from	CDM	
projects	 in	South	Korea	come	from	projects	that	 involve	technology	transfer.	Similarly,	
Chinese	 guidelines	 for	 CDM	 project	 approval	 stipulate	 that	 ‘‘CDM	 project	 activities	
should	promote	the	transfer	of	environmentally	sound	technology	to	China’’	(Haites	et	
al.	2006).			
	
Another	way	to	make	technology	transfer	more	likely	for	a	country	hosting	a	project	in	
some	 sectors	 is	 to	 improve	 its	 absorptive	 (or	 technological)	 capacity	 (see	
Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 2008	 for	 empirical	 evidence).	 Absorptive	 capacity	 refers	 to	 a	
country’s	 ability	 to	 conduct	 research	 in	 order	 to	 understand,	 implement,	 and	 adapt	
																																																								
14	Source:	Lecoq	and	Ambrosi	(2007).	
15	Schmid	(2012)	provides	empirical	evidence	that	burdensome	administrative	
procedures	to	start	a	new	business	impact	negatively	the	likelihood	of	a	technological	
transfer.	
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imported	 technologies	 (Popp	 2011).	 It	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 workforce’s	 technological	
literacy	and	 skills,	which	are	 influenced	by	many	 factors	 that	 are	 controlled	by	public	
authorities,	 such	 as	 education	 and	 infrastructures.	 Although	most	 emerging	 countries	
are	 nowadays	 equipped	 with	 relatively	 high	 absorptive	 capacity,	 it	 can	 make	 a	
difference	in	the	low	developed	countries.		
	
Finally,	openness	to	trade	seems	to	matter.	According	to	Schmid	(2012),	higher	applied	
tariffs	 on	 environmental	 goods	 and	 services	 impacts	 negatively	 the	 likelihood	 of	
technological	transfer	in	CDM	projects.	Reducing	tariffs	of	those	environmental	products	
might	make	technological	transfer	easier.		
	
3‐	Increase	a	firm’s	productivity:	the	Porter	Hypothesis	
	
3.1	The	Porter	Hypothesis	
More	than	20	years	ago,	Professor	Michael	Porter	suggested	that	pollution	was	generally	
associated	 with	 a	 waste	 of	 resources,	 or	 with	 lost	 energy	 potential:	 “Pollution	 is	 a	
manifestation	of	economic	waste	and	involves	unnecessary	or	incomplete	utilisation	of	
resources…	 Reducing	 pollution	 is	 often	 coincident	 with	 improving	 productivity	 with	
which	 resources	 are	 used”	 (Porter	 and	 van	 der	 Linde	 1995:	 105).	 Based	 on	 this	
reasoning,	Porter	argues	that	“properly	designed	environmental	regulations	can	trigger	
innovation	 that	 may	 partially	 or	 more	 than	 fully	 offset	 the	 costs	 of	 complying	 with	
them”.	This	has	come	to	be	known	as	the	Porter	Hypothesis	(PH).	In	other	words,	 it	 is	
possible	to	reduce	pollution	emissions	and	production	costs	at	the	same	time,	resulting	
in	“win‐win”	situations.	
	
The	PH	is	controversial.	First,	the	evidence	initially	provided	to	support	it	is	based	on	a	
small	number	of	 company	case	 studies,	 in	which	 firms	were	able	 to	 reduce	both	 their	
pollution	emissions	and	their	production	costs.	As	such,	it	can	hardly	be	generalised	to	
the	 entire	 population	 of	 firms.	 Second,	 economists	 would	 suggest	 that,	 if	 there	 are	
opportunities	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 inefficiencies,	 companies	 should	 identify	 them	 by	
themselves	without	the	need	for	government	intervention	(Oates	et	al.,	1995).		However,	
over	the	last	twenty	years,	many	studies	have	proposed	analytical	justifications	for	the	
PH.	 It	could	be	that	the	 interests	of	companies	and	their	managers	are	not	aligned,	 for	
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several	 reasons	 (e.g.	 risk	 aversion,	 time‐inconsistency,	 asymmetric	 information).	
Regulations	force	firms	to	adopt	innovations	that	are	profitable	for	the	firm	but	not	for	
its	managers.	As	Ambec	and	Barla	(2006)	argue,	the	PH	can	be	valid	if	a	market	failure	
exists	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 environmental	 externality.	 Examples	 include	 knowledge	
spillovers	(see	Section	4)	or	market	power.	For	instance,	Simpson	and	Bradford	(1996)	
investigate	the	impact	on	environmental	regulation	in	a	model	with	firms	competing	on	
international	 markets.	 They	 show	 that	 more	 stringent	 environmental	 regulations	
commit	a	domestic	firm	to	an	aggressive	cost‐reducing	programme,	thereby	enjoying	a	
first‐mover	advantage.		
		
3.2	Empirical	evidence	of	the	PH	
On	the	empirical	side,	Jaffe	and	Palmer	(1997)	present	three	distinct	variants	of	PH.	In	
their	framework,	the	“weak”	version	of	the	hypothesis	is	that	environmental	regulation	
will	 stimulate	 certain	 kinds	 of	 environmental	 innovations,	 although	 there	 is	 no	 claim	
that	the	direction	or	rate	of	this	increased	innovation	is	socially	beneficial.	The	“narrow”	
version	of	the	hypothesis	asserts	that	flexible	environmental	policy	instruments,	such	as	
pollution	charges	or	tradable	permits,	give	firms	a	greater	incentive	to	innovate	than	do	
prescriptive	 regulations	 such	 as	 technology‐based	 standards.	 Finally,	 the	 “strong”	
version	posits	that	properly	designed	regulation	may	induce	innovation	that	more	than	
compensates	for	the	cost	of	compliance	and	improves	the	financial	situation	of	the	firm.	
Many	researchers	have	tested	the	different	versions	of	the	PH	empirically.	Overall,	 the	
empirical	 literature	provides	evidence	for	the	weak	version	but	not	for	the	strong	one.	
Most	studies	find	a	positive	although	sometimes	weak	relationship	between,	on	the	one	
hand,	more	stringent	environmental	policies	and	innovation	measured	by	investment	in	
R&D	and,	on	the	other,	new	technologies	or	successful	patent	applications.	However,	the	
impact	of	environmental	regulations	on	productivity	or	business	performance	turns	out	
to	be	negative	in	general	(see	Ambec	et	al.	2013	for	a	review).16		
																																																								
16	A	seminal	contribution	to	this	literature	is	Lanoie	et	al.	(2011),	who	was	the	first	to	
analyse	the	full	causality	chain	of	the	PH.	The	authors	examine	both	the	weak	and	the	
strong	versions	of	the	Porter	Hypothesis,	based	on	a	survey	at	the	production	plant	level	
in	seven	OECD	countries.	Their	methodology	managed	to	disentangle	the	direct	effect	of	
environmental	regulation	on	business	performance	from	the	indirect	effect	through	
more	investment	in	R&D.	They	found	a	positive	indirect	effect,	which	tends	to	validate	
the	weak	version	of	the	PH.	However,	it	does	not	outweigh	the	direct	negative	effect,	so	
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Several	empirical	investigations	suggest	that	the	net	impact	of	regulations	seems	to	be	
less	 negative	when	 stringency	 increases.	 For	 instance,	 Berman	 and	 Bui	 (2001)	 found	
that	refineries	located	close	to	Los	Angeles	are	significantly	more	productive	than	other	
US	refineries,	despite	the	more	stringent	air	quality	regulation	in	the	Los	Angeles	area.	
Similarly,	Alpay	et	al.	(2002)	report	that	the	productivity	of	the	Mexican	food‐processing	
industry	is	increasing	with	the	pressure	of	environmental	regulation,	which	leads	them	
to	conclude	that	more	stringent	regulations	are	not	always	detrimental	to	productivity.	
It	seems	that,	even	if	there	is	no	systematic	evidence	of	a	“win‐win”	situation	à	la	Porter,	
more	 stringent	environmental	 regulation	 is	not	always	bad	 for	business.	 It	 sometimes	
fosters	 innovation	 that	 gives	 firms	 a	 competitive	 advantage.	 The	 open	 question	 for	
policy	makers	is	how	to	design	policies	to	obtain	a	causality	chain	à	la	Porter.		
	
	
3.3	Public	policies	for	profitable	green	innovations	
	Michael	Porter	 favours	stringent	but	 flexible	 instruments	such	as	pollution	charges	or	
tradable	 emission	permits.	 These	 so‐called	 “economic	 instruments”	 are	more	 likely	 to	
enhance	 innovation	 than	 “command‐and‐control”	 instruments	 such	 as	 technological	
standards.	 They	 give	more	 freedom	 to	 firms	 as	 regards	 the	 technology	 used	 to	 abate	
pollution.		In	contrast,	by	imposing	a	given	technology	or	certain	inputs,	a	technological	
standard	provides	fewer	incentives	to	innovate.		Similarly,	emission	standards	–	i.e.	caps	
on	 emissions	 –	 or	 performance	 standards	 –	 cap	 on	 emission	 per	 output	 –	 do	 not	
encourage	 firms	 to	go	beyond	standards.	 	On	 the	other	hand,	 they	can	save	money	by	
reducing	 emissions	 further	 with	 pollution	 charges.	 Similarly,	 firms	 would	 purchase	
fewer	permits	 on	 the	market	 or	 even	 sell	 their	 own	emission	 endowments	 by	 cutting	
emissions	beyond	their	own	emission	rights.		
	
The	use	of	economic	instruments	appears	to	be	a	necessary	condition	for	the	PH	to	hold.	
This	is	known	as	its	“narrow	version”.	Once	an	economic	instrument	has	been	selected,	
it	 should	 be	 designed	 to	 be	 less	 harmful	 to	 the	 regulated	 industry.	 To	 reduce	 the	
negative	 impact	 on	 profits,	 pollution	 charges	 should	 be	 earmarked	 within	 the	 taxed	
																																																																																																																																																																													
that	the	net	effect	turns	out	to	be	negative,	which	invalidates	the	strong	version	of	the	
PH.			
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industry.	The	money	collected	can	be	redistributed	directly	to	firms,	depending	on	size	
measured	 as	 output	 or	 worker	 force.	 It	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 subsidy	 environmental	
R&D	or	 the	 adoption	of	 cleaner	 technologies.	Another	way	 to	make	pollution	 taxation	
neutral	 for	 the	 industry	 is	 through	a	differentiated	 tax	and	subsidy	scheme	around	an	
emission	target.	Firms	are	taxed	for	pollution	emissions	above	the	target,	and	subsidised	
for	 emission	 units	 below	 it.17		 Similarly,	 emission	 permits	 can	 be	 assigned	 for	 free	 to	
firms	at	 least	during	an	initial	phase.	This	would	guarantee	the	political	 feasibility	of	a	
cap‐and‐trade	 system.	 Firms	 still	 have	 incentives	 to	 invest	 in	 pollution	 abatement	
technologies	as	long	as	they	can	make	money	by	selling	permits.	Later	on,	fewer	permits	
should	be	granted	for	free	and	more	sold	by	auction,	to	ensure	entry	of	new	players	into	
the	industry.		
	
Other	policy	 instruments	can	be	effective	 in	greening	 firms.	Voluntary	approaches	can	
be	 a	 substitute	 for	 mandatory	 environmental	 constraints	 in	 countries	 with	 weak	
institutions	 (see	 Never	 and	 Kemp	 in	 this	 volume).	 Examples	 include	 information	
disclosure	 programmes	 or	 programmes	 to	 encourage	 ISO	 14001	 certification	 through	
training	 and	 advertising	 the	 benefits	 of	 certification.	 	 There	 is	 evidence	 of	 successful	
information	 disclosure	 programmes.	 For	 instance,	 Powers	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 found	 that	
India’s	 Green	 Rating	 Program	 caused	 large	 pulp	 and	 paper	 plants	 with	 the	 worst	
environmental	performance	to	reduce	emissions	of	certain	pollutants	by	9%	to	19%.	In	
the	 same	 vein,	 Garcia,	 Sterner	 and	 Afsah	 (2007)	 estimated	 that	 Indonesia’s	 PROPER	
programme	reduced	firms’	emissions	by	one‐third.			
	
	
4‐	Increase	a	sector’s	productivity	through	knowledge	spillovers	
	
4.1	Knowledge	spillovers	as	a	market	failure	
Green	policies	foster	innovation	in	environment‐friendly	technology	and	may	therefore	
generate	 positive	 externalities	 among	 firms	 in	 the	 R&D	 process.	 As	 knowledge	 is	 by	
nature	a	public	good,	and	new	technologies	become	public	knowledge	when	transferred	
																																																								
17	Examples	include	the	so‐called	“eco‐bonus‐malus”	scheme	implemented	in	France	for	
car	CO2	emissions.	Cars	that	are	emitting	more	than	the	standard	(around	130g	of	CO2	
per	100	km)	are	taxed,	while	those	which	are	emitting	less	are	subsidised.	The	scheme	is	
designed	to	be	budget‐balanced.					
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to	production	processes,	firms	will	not	get	the	full	return	on	their	R&D	investment.	Some	
(if	 not	 all)	 of	 the	 knowledge	 embodied	 in	 the	 invention	 also	 becomes	 available	 to	
competitors	 which	 can	 (fully	 or	 partly)	 copy	 or	 improve	 the	 new	 technology.	 These	
knowledge	 spillovers	benefit	 the	 economy	whenever	new	 technologies	 are	developed,	
yet	 they	 are	 dissuasive	 to	 investment	 in	 new	 technologies.	 As	 a	 result,	market	 forces	
under‐provide	R&D	investment.	Public	policies	 that	 foster	 investment	 in	environment‐
friendly	 technologies	 mitigate	 this	 market	 failure	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 all,	 including	
innovative	firms.		
	
4.2	Knowledge	spillovers	in	green	innovation	
Recent	estimates	suggest	that	knowledge	spillovers	are	significant	in	green	innovation.	
Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 analyse	 knowledge	 spillovers	 in	 clean	 and	 dirty	
technologies,	based	on	patent	citations.	This	information	is	part	of	the	“state‐of‐art”	on	a	
patent	 application:	 innovators	 applying	 for	 a	 patent	 are	 required	 to	 cite	 all	 previous	
innovations	 on	 which	 the	 new	 innovation	 is	 based.	 A	 citation	 indicates	 that	 the	
knowledge	 contained	 in	 the	 document	 has	 been	useful	 to	 develop	 the	 innovation.	 For	
this	reason,	patent	citation	can	be	been	seen	as	a	measure	of	knowledge	spillovers.	The	
study	 by	 Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 covers	 four	 technological	 fields:	 energy	 production,	
automobiles,	 fuel,	 and	 lighting.	 Clean	 patents	 receive	 on	 average	 43%	more	 citations	
than	dirty	patents,	and	are	cited	by	more	prominent	patents.	These	results	suggest	that	
public	 support	 to	 R&D	would	 be	more	 effective	 in	 boosting	 innovation	 and	 growth	 if	
they	targeted	green	technologies.		
	
The	 positive	 impact	 of	 R&D‐enhancing	 policy	 is	 likely	 to	 hold	 primarily	 in	 developed	
countries	 where	most	 of	 the	 innovation	 occurs,	 including	 for	 green	 technologies.	 For	
instance,	 Lanjouw	and	Mody	 (1996)	 found	 that	 the	United	States,	 Japan	and	Germany	
accounted	for	two‐thirds	of	climate‐friendly	innovation.	Yet	some	emerging	countries	do	
manage	to	produce	a	significant	share	of	green	innovations.	In	the	sample	they	analysed,	
Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 found	 that	 18.5%	 of	 the	 climate‐friendly	 innovations	
patented	 from	 2000	 to	 2005	 originated	 in	 China,	 South	 Korea,	 Russia	 or	 Brazil.	 It	 is	
likely	that	emerging	countries	will	catch‐up	in	green	innovation,	triggered	by	domestic	
green	 policies	 (see	 case	 studies	 on	 Brazil	 and	 China	 in	 this	 volume),	 the	 demand	 for	
green	 technologies	 from	 developed	 countries	 and	 by	 investment	 in	 carbon	 offsetting.	
	 16
Another	 important	 component	 of	 the	 geography	 of	 innovation	 is	 knowledge	
dissemination.	Dechezleprêtre	et	al.	 (2011)	estimated	 the	export	of	 climate‐mitigation	
inventions	 by	 country.	 They	 found	 that	 emerging	 countries	 tend	 to	 export	 less	 than	
developed	 countries:	 around	 7%	 for	 China	 and	 Brazil,	 as	 compared	 to	 42%	 for	 the	
United	States	or	56%	for	Germany.	This	 suggests	 two	particularities	of	 the	 innovation	
process	in	emerging	economies.	First,	emerging	countries	tend	to	specialise	in	adapting	
green	technologies	to	local	conditions.	Second,	spillovers	are	likely	to	be	greater	within	
the	country	 itself	 than	abroad,	which	 is	an	argument	 for	 increasing	support	 to	R&D	 in	
emerging	countries.		
	
4.3	Policies	for	green	innovation		
As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 there	 is	 now	 ample	 evidence	 that	
environmental	 regulations	 stimulate	 innovation	 in	 green	 technologies.	 Knowledge	
spillovers	reinforce	the	benefit	of	pushing	for	more	environmental	innovation,	as	firms	
are	 likely	to	get	a	higher	return	on	their	 investments	 in	R&D	for	environment‐friendly	
technologies.	 Moreover,	 the	 spillovers	 can	 spread	 out	 to	 productivity‐enhancing	
innovation	in	the	spirit	of	the	Porter	Hypothesis.		Public	policies	that	foster	demand	for	
green	technologies	do	not	only	reduce	pollution	and	the	use	of	natural	resources;	they	
also	foster	innovation	and	therefore	growth.		
	
Governments	 can	help	 to	make	 this	 scenario	more	 likely	 in	 several	ways.	 	 First,	 firms	
should	be	rewarded	for	investing	in	R&D,	which	means	protecting	their	inventions	with	
effective	patents.	Public	authorities	can	improve	intellectual	property	rights	by	granting	
patents	 more	 easily,	 reducing	 transaction	 costs	 for	 submitting	 new	 patents,	 and	
enforcing	 them.	 This	 means	 facilitating	 patent	 monitoring	 and	 litigation	 through	 the	
judicial	 system.	 It	 should	 also	 facilitate	 technology	 transfers	 through	 licensing	
agreements.	 Firms	 can	 also	 be	 rewarded	 through	 industrial	 policies,	 including	
investment	in	big	equipment	and	infrastructure,	subsidies	or	tax	cuts	for	R&D.		
	
Second,	since	 technological	absorptive	capacity	seems	to	be	an	 important	determinant	
of	a	country’s	ability	to	innovate,	government	should	invest	in	education,	technological	
training	and	knowledge	dissemination	infrastructure	(e.g.	internet	access).	In	emerging	
countries,	 it	 should	 foster	 innovation	 in	 green	 technologies	 that	 is	best	 suited	 to	 local	
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conditions.	 In	 less‐developed	 countries,	 it	 should	 facilitate	 the	 transfer	 of	 green	 but	
complex	technologies	such	as	wind	and	solar	power.	As	Vidican	shows	in	her	case	study	
on	renewable	energy	in	Morocco	in	this	volume,	even	here	certain	products	and	services	
can	be	localised	and	green	jobs	be	created.	Moreover,	such	investments	may	be	able	to	
help	attract	some	CDM	and	carbon	offset	projects.		
	
Summary	and	conclusion	for	green	growth		
Being	 green	 is	 not	 always	 detrimental	 to	 competiveness.	 A	 firm	 can	 deploy	 several	
strategies	 to	 reduce	 its	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 environment,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
securing	 a	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 international	 markets.	 It	 can	 invest	 in	
environmental	 R&D,	 adopt	 cleaner	 technologies,	 supply	 environment‐friendly	
technologies,	and	enhance	its	product’s	environmental	quality	throughout	its	life.	Even	if	
those	strategies	are	costly,	 they	might	 turn	out	 to	be	profitable.	 Investment	 in	cleaner	
technologies	can	lead	to	productivity	improvement	in	the	long	run,	which	would	spread	
in	the	economy	through	knowledge	spillovers.	With	a	demand	driven	by	carbon	finance	
(investment	 in	 CDM	 and	 other	 carbon	 offsetting	 projects)	 and	 renewable	 energy	
mandates	 (feed‐in	 tariffs	 and	 renewable	 portfolio	 standards),	 firms	 specialised	 in	
producing	 climate‐friendly	 technologies	 (e.g.	 solar	 photovoltaic	 panels	 and	 wind	
turbine)	 are	 expanding,	 particularly	 in	 emerging	 countries.	 	 Finally,	 the	 growth	 of	
organic	farming	and	fair	trade	has	created	new	opportunities	in	agriculture	and	the	food	
industry	in	many	developing	countries.		
	
Many	 public	 policies	 can	 help	 to	 secure	 a	 competitive	 advantage	with	 green	 business	
strategies.	 First,	 environmental	 policy	 should	 be	 flexible	 to	 foster	 innovation.	 This	
means	implementing	economic	instruments	such	as	refunded	emission	taxes	or	tradable	
allowances	 rather	 than	 technological	 standards.	Second,	 industrial	policy	 should	make	
patenting	 and	 technological	 transfer	 easier	 and	 more	 effective.	 It	 should	 also	 favour	
public	 support	 to	 environmental	 innovation	 to	 mitigate	 under‐investment	 due	 to	
knowledge	 spillovers.	 Third,	 technological	 absorption	 capacity	 must	 be	 improved	 by	
investing	 in	 education,	 technological	 training	 and	 infrastructures	 (communication,	
transportation,	 energy,	 etc.).	 Fourth,	 government	 should	 work	 with	 NGOs	 and	
international	 organisations	 to	 facilitate	 environmental	 labelling	 with	 transparent	
criteria	and	a	reliable	traceability	of	products	throughout	the	supply	chain.			
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To	conclude,	I	briefly	mention	three	issues	that	deserve	further	discussion.		First,	public	
policies	 that	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 the	 past	 in	 bringing	 green	 growth	might	 not	 be	
effective	in	the	future.	In	the	last	years,	the	generous	support	to	wind	and	solar	power	
has	 been	 cut	 in	 many	 countries	 in	 Europe.	 Investment	 in	 new	 renewable	 energy	
production	capacity	 in	Europe	has	dropped	 from	a	record	of	$	155	billions	 in	2011	to	
only		$	48	billions	in	2013.18	Similarly,	CDM	projects	have	become	less	attractive	in	the	
last	years.	The	volume	of	carbon‐offsetting	projects	has	fallen	since	2012.	 In	2015,	the	
market	experienced	an	excess	supply	of	projects,	an	average	price	of	$	3.3	per	ton	of	CO2	
on	all	projects	 in	2015	with	a	record	$	0.1	for	the	 lowest	valued	projects.19		Hopefully,	
the	 2015	 Paris	 agreement	within	 the	 UNFCCC	 could	 reverse	 the	 trend.	 It	 launches	 in	
Article	 6	 a	 new	 mechanism	 that	 aims	 at	 financing	 carbon	 offsetting	 projects	 in	
developing	countries:	 the	 internationally	 transferred	mitigation	outcomes.	A	 signatory	
country	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 invest	 in	 another	 country	 to	 meet	 its	 nationally	
determined	contribution	on	climate	change	mitigation.		
	
Second,	the	policy	implemented	for	enhancing	profitable	green	growth	should	vary	with	
the	 level	 of	 development	 in	 a	 country.	 Less	 developed	 countries	 should	 prioritize	
improving	 their	 technological	 absorptive	 capacity,	 simplifying	 and	 standardizing	 the	
accreditation	process	for	carbon	offsetting	projects	and	building	up	a	reliable	supply	of	
green	labelled	products.		Emerging	countries	can	afford	to	subsidise	investment	in	green	
technologies	 to	 support	 their	 own	 industry.	 They	 should	 also	 strengthen	 their	
intellectual	 property	 rights	 to	 attract	 technological	 know‐how	 from	 foreign	 investors	
and	encourage	its	transfer.				
	
Lastly,	 it	 is	worth	 to	mention	that	protecting	natural	resources	and	reducing	pollution	
impact	 positively	 society	 through	 several	 channels	 that	 can	 be	 indirectly	 beneficial	 to	
firms.	Many	 economic	 activities	 rely	 on	 ecosystem	 services	 provided	 by	 forest,	water	
																																																								
18	Source	:	REN21	10	years	of	renewable	energy	progress		2004‐2014	
http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/activities/Topical%20Reports/REN21_1
0yr.pdf	
19	Source	:Raising	Ambition	:	State	of	the	Voluntary	Carbon	Market	2016,	Ecosystem	
Marketplace,		http://www.forest‐trends.org/documents/files/doc_5242.pdf	
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stream	and	oceans.	Workers	are	in	better	health	and	thus	more	productive	with	cleaner	
air	and	water.	All	those	indirect	effects	should	be	included	in	a	cost‐benefit	analysis	of	
green	policies.		
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